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Abstract 
Incumbent incentive for competence-signaling and lack of voter information are generally thought 
to be factors that increase the prevalence of political budget cycles. These mechanisms should be 
more prevalent in new political units. Since the creation of new political units is rarely exogenous, 
however, serious endogeneity issues would be an issue for empirical studies of this subject. To 
overcome these problems, I use a Danish local government reform—which amalgamated some (but 
not all) Danish municipalities, thereby creating new political units—in a way that is arguably quasi-
experimental to study whether political budget cycles are larger in new political units. Contrary to 
theoretical predictions, political budget cycles seem to be of a smaller scale in the new 
municipalities, but only regarding budget cycles in budgetary overruns. The findings are of wider 
interest for discussions the mechanisms behind context-conditional political budget cycles. 
 
Keywords: Political budget cycles; conditional political budget cycles; local government budget; 
budgetary overruns; quasi-experiment; local government reform 
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1. Introduction 
Are electorally motivated increases in public deficits—political budget cycles—larger in new 
political units? The article in hand investigates this question by exploiting using a Danish municipal 
reform that caused an exogenous shock to the age structure of Danish municipalities. 
 
Political budget cycles—the occurrence of election-year-induced increased spending/decreased 
revenue collection and subsequent deficits—is arguably one of the most studied subjects in political 
economy and to some extent political science. This literature usually builds on the broader 
theoretical and empirical literature on the political business cycle, election-induced economic 
expansions due to loose fiscal or monetary policy (Nordhaus, 1975; Alesina, et al., 1997).1 While 
the empirical study of the occurrence and magnitude of political budget cycles usually focuses on 
budget deficits, electoral cycles have been detected in the composition of public spending (Katsimi 
and Sarantides, 2012), amendments to the initial budget proposal (Wehner, 2013), public wage 
increases (Matscke, 2003), and numerous other policy instruments; see Dubois (2016) for a recent 
review of the literature. 
 
There is growing consensus in the study of political budget cycles, especially concerning budget 
deficits, that they are conditional on the incentive of the incumbent to run political budget cycles 
and the ability of voters to know about their occurrence. The importance of the incumbent incentive 
and voter information for the size of the political budget cycle underscores the cross-national 
findings that political budget cycles occur more frequently and are of a greater scale in less 
                                                          
1 For a seminal model dealing specifically with budget cycles, see Rogoff (1990). 
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developed countries (Shi and Svensson, 2006; Klomp and de Haan, 2013), as well as recent studies 
of subnational political budget cycles (Aidt et al., 2011; Klein and Sakurai, 2015). A similar cross-
national finding is that political budget cycles are more prevalent in countries that recently 
transitioned into democracy, which suggests that the size of political budget cycles should vary with 
the age of the democratic regime (Brender and Drazen, 2005). 
 
This article makes a related argument: that political budget cycles might be greater in new political 
units in general, including new subnational units, even despite lengthy democratic traditions. The 
main mechanism is that local policymakers in new polities, including new states and municipalities, 
would have a greater incentive to signal competence to voters due to a lower level of political 
reputation in the new political units. Moreover, voters in new polities have no information about 
previous electoral manipulation in the polity, even if they have considerable previous experience 
with democratic politics. The perceived net gains from electoral fiscal manipulation2 should 
therefore increase when political units are new and the political budget should consequently be 
larger. 
 
The creation of new political units rarely occurs exogenously, however, which could cause serious 
problems with identifying a potential causal effect of polity age on the size of political budget 
cycles. This article overcomes this problem by using a reform to the municipal structure of 
Denmark in 2007, which amalgamated some but not all Danish municipalities, thereby creating new 
political units while leaving others intact, in a way that is arguably quasi-experimental, at least 
                                                          
2 For a recent investigation of the electoral gain of political budget cycles at the local level, see Chortareas et al. 
(2016). 
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regarding political budget cycles. This enables us to compare the magnitude of political budget 
cycles in the new amalgamated municipalities and the older municipalities within the same national 
political-administrative context to examine whether a potential difference in the size of political 
budget cycles changes over time. 
 
However, the empirical results do not support the argument that new municipalities experience 
larger political budget cycles. To the contrary—if anything, new municipalities seem to have 
smaller political budget cycles than older municipalities, an effect which is only statistically 
significant for budget cycles in municipal budgetary overruns and seems to be driven mainly by the 
first election after the amalgamation. If a greater incumbent incentive for reputation-building 
actually existed in the new municipalities, they only seem to have affected budgetary management 
rather than pure election-year fiscal manipulation, and this effect seems to have been very short-
lived. These results speak to the wider literature on conditional political budget cycles and cast 
some doubt on whether lack of voter information about the relevant political unit is a crucial 
mechanism behind the size of political budget cycles. 
 
The structure of the article is as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical argument for why we 
would expect political budget cycles to be larger in new political units. Section 3 describes the 
setting and context of the recent municipal reform in Denmark, which form the basis for the quasi-
experimental design of the article and sets up the central hypotheses to be tested. Section 4 deals 
with the data and estimation method used to test the hypotheses. Section 5 contains the empirical 
results from the tests, while section 6 discusses the results. Section 7 concludes. 
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2. Theory 
The key mechanism for why we should expect political budget cycles to be larger in new political 
units is an increased incentive for incumbent politicians to signal competence to voters and build 
reputation. The core reason for incumbent politicians to engage in election-year manipulation in 
most theoretical models of political budget cycles is to signal competence to voters (Rogoff, 1990; 
Aidt et al., 2011) and/or preference alignment with voters (Drazen and Eslava, 2010). It would be 
very plausible that incumbent politicians in a new political unit have—at least perceivably—a lesser 
reputation in the context of their political unit, as they are less likely to be known among at least 
some voters3 in a new political unit than in an older political unit. These politicians therefore have a 
greater incentive to use the election-year expansion of public spending/decreases in taxation to 
signal competence and/or commitment to certain policies. These arguments are similar to those 
made about how the age of political parties reduces the extent to which parties run political budget 
cycles as incumbents. Since political parties establish their reputation and ability to credibly commit 
to certain policies and voters gain more information about the parties as time goes by, the age of 
incumbent government parties should reduce their incentive to run political budget cycles (Hanusch 
and Keefer, 2014). 
 
The information level of voters in new political units would be a related reason for the incumbent’s 
incentive to run political budget cycles would be greater in new political units. Voters in newly 
formed political units, be they municipalities, provinces, or even states, will have no previous 
experience of election-year manipulation in their current political units and potentially low levels of 
knowledge about the general political functions of their newly formed polity. In turn, this would 
                                                          
3 If, e.g., the new political unit was formed from an amalgamation of two or more previous political units. 
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incentivize incumbent politicians to exploit this lack of knowledge, as voters are less aware that 
election-year increases in public spending/decrease in taxation are due to short-term electoral 
manipulation rather than incumbent competence. As the political units age, however, voters should 
increasingly learn about the fiscal manipulation of incumbents. The incumbent politicians would 
then adjust to the updated voter information and be less likely to run electorally induced fiscal 
expansion. The information level of voters is generally considered a key conditioning factor for the 
existence of political budget cycles and often has a central position in theoretical models (Shi and 
Svensson, 2006: pp. 1375-1379). The finding that government transparency, including budget 
transparency, seems to moderate political budget cycles (Alt and Lassen, 2006; Klomp and de 
Haan, 2013, pp. 336-337) also suggests that a lack of voter information could be an important driver 
of political budget cycles. Nonetheless, the potential relation between voter information and the age 
of the relevant political units and the subsequent effects on political budget cycles have not been 
rigorously studied. 
 
According to these arguments, we should expect incumbent politicians in new political units to run 
larger political budget cycles. As evidence suggests that voters adjust their evaluation of incumbent 
performance as time passes (Nannestad et al., 2003) and potentially gain more knowledge about 
past electoral manipulation, however, it seems plausible that both the reputation-building 
mechanism and the information mechanism will wane over time.4 Consequently, as new polities 
age, the political budget cycle ought to decline. 
                                                          
4 This approach to political budget cycles could also explain the findings of Treisman and Gimpelson (2001), who find 
that Russian incumbents seemed to change the policy tool to manipulate the economy for each election during 
national elections in the 1990s. 
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In summary, then, there is reason to expect electoral budget cycles to be of a greater magnitude in 
new political units—sovereign countries as well as subnational units, such as provinces and 
municipalities—as the incentive for incumbent politicians to signal competence is greater and 
voters have less context-specific political knowledge. There is also reason to expect that as new 
political units age, the extent of the electoral manipulation decreases as politicians acquire more 
credible reputations and voters obtain more information. 
 
Consistent with the view that a new political regime makes fiscal manipulation more attractive to 
incumbent politicians, evidence from Israeli municipal elections suggests that voters’ electoral 
tolerance for debt increases are higher in new political units (Brender, 2003: p. 2201), although 
these results might be biased by unobservable characteristics of the new municipalities. 
 
Consequently, the arguments about polity age and political budget cycles are difficult to assess 
empirically due to serious endogeneity problems. The creation of other types of new political units 
is clearly not exogenous to voter information and political experience. Since new political units, 
national and subnational alike, are not created randomly, the new polity hypothesis regarding 
political budget cycles is difficult to verify robustly. This article is able to exploit a quasi-
experimental setting to investigate whether political budget cycles are indeed larger in new political 
units. 
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3. The quasi-experimental setting: Danish municipal reform 
In 2007 a new municipal structure was introduced in Denmark reducing the number of 
municipalities from 271 to 98 with the explicit objective of forming on average larger 
municipalities. 239 of the previous municipalities were amalgamated to form 66 new municipalities, 
whereas 32 municipalities were left untouched. With the exception of the two island municipalities 
of Bornholm (created when five municipalities were amalgamated in 2003) and Ærø (created when 
two municipalities amalgamated in 2006),5 the 32 municipalities had existed since the last Danish 
municipal reform in the early 1970s.6 While the old municipalities were technically free to 
amalgamate into municipalities of a certain size as determined by the central government, Bhatti 
and Hansen (2011) have demonstrated how citizens’ commuting patterns, municipal size, and 
distance to each other predict amalgamation, whereas economic and political factors do not seem to 
matter. Especially with respect to electoral budget cycles, this renders the reform a quasi-
experimental setting (Lassen and Serritzlew, 2011: pp. 243-244). 
 
While this Danish municipal reform has been used to study the effect of polity size on the internal 
political efficacy of citizens (Lassen and Serritzlew, 2011), scale effects in the cost of public 
administration and services (Blom-Hansen et al., 2014; Blom-Hansen et al., 2016), common-pool 
aspects of public expenditure decisions (Blom-Hansen, 2010; Hansen, 2014), as well as general 
fiscal outcomes (Hansen et al., 2014), it has not been utilized to study whether the age of a political 
unit affects the scale of political budget cycles. Given that the reform created new political units out 
                                                          
5 For the purpose of data analysis, Ærø is coded as amalgamated while Bornholm is not. 
6 A full description of the reform and amalgamation process can be found in Bhatti and Hansen (2011: pp. 214-217). 
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of some but not all of the municipalities and consequently was an exogenous shock to the age 
structure of a set of subnational units within the same national political-administrative frame, 
together with the fact that the amalgamation of municipalities seems unrelated to the potential 
political and economic confounders of political budget cycles (Bhatti and Hansen, 2011), its quasi-
experimental nature makes it ideal for studying the effect of the age of political units on the scale of 
political budget cycles. 
 
The reform should plausibly have changed the information level of voters in the new municipalities 
given that the administrative units and to some extent the local politicians were new and the new 
municipalities would have no independent history of political budget cycles. This should increase 
the perceived electoral benefit of running political budget cycles, since local politicians would have 
a greater incentive to appear competent and build their reputations in the short run, as they would on 
average be less known by their potential voters than politicians from non-amalgamated 
municipalities. Furthermore, voters in amalgamated municipalities could be perceived by local 
politicians to be less informed about previous electoral fiscal manipulation, which would further 
increase the incentive to run political budget cycles. However, the previous democratic experiences 
of the local citizens would be unchanged in both new and older municipalities, so if this general 
democratic experience mechanism drives the effect of being a new polity on the size of political 
budget cycles (Brender and Drazen, 2005), we should not expect the size of budget cycles to differ 
between the amalgamated and non-amalgamated municipalities. This reform is therefore ideal for 
investigating whether political budget cycles are larger in new polities due to an increased incentive 
for incumbents to appear competent and the lack of polity-specific information available to voters. 
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We would expect the new municipalities to have higher levels of political budget cycles and this 
difference between new and old municipalities to decrease for with each subsequent election. The 
theoretical argument about polity age and political budget cycles gives rise to two hypotheses in the 
Danish municipal context: 
H1: The magnitude of political budget cycles should be greater in amalgamated municipalities. 
H2: The effect of amalgamation on political budget cycles should decline from the first to the 
second election after the reform. 
 
4. Data and estimation 
The data used to test the relevant hypotheses in the Danish municipal setting consists of all 98 
Danish municipalities in the years 2007–2013. Two different measures of potential local political 
budget cycles are used: One is municipal budgetary overruns measured as the difference between 
budgeted and realized fiscal surplus in Danish Kroner (DKK) per municipal citizen, where previous 
research studying Danish municipalities has found considerable evidence of political cycles 
(Serritzlew, 2005). The other is the simple fiscal surplus in DKK per municipal citizen. Both 
measures only include current operating expenditures in current prices and exclude local investment 
expenditure. While studies of local political budget cycles often find cycles in public capital 
investment, since these are arguably visible to voters (Klein and Sakurai, 2015; Baskaran et al., 
2016), Danish municipalities do not use accrual accounting for investment expenditures. 
Consequently, investment expenditures in the within-year accounts might not always reflect 
building and maintenance activities—the activities that are actually visible to voters—within that 
specific year. This accounting issue might be a source of bias when trying to detect opportunistic 
electoral cycles in the official investment expenditures of Danish municipalities. Current operating 
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expenditures, the main component of which is public wage expenditure, suffers much less from this 
potential source of bias. Other studies of expenditures in Danish municipalities also tend to only 
analyze current expenditure (Blom-Hansen et al., 2016: p. 819). The data is from the Danish 
National Institute for Municipal and Regional Research (KORA). Both budgetary overruns and 
realized fiscal surpluses largely exhibit a normal distribution, and I therefore choose to analyze 
them in unlogged format, which also makes interpretation of the later coefficients more intuitive. 
 
The central independent variables are the occurrence of a municipal election and its interaction with 
the amalgamation status of the municipality. Municipal election is measured by a dummy, which 
takes the value 1 if there is a municipal election in this year. Two municipal elections were held 
(2009 and 2013) within the timeframe of the analysis. Danish municipal elections are all held 
simultaneously in the month of November and cannot be held early, so the use of a calendar year 
measure of election year should be sufficient to discover within-year political budget cycles. 
Amalgamation is also measured by a dummy, which takes the value 1 if the municipality was 
formed as a result of the 2007 reform. 
 
In addition to the central independent variables, I include a variety of controls regarding political, 
economic, geographical, and demographic aspects of the municipality. The central political control 
is a dummy for whether the mayor is from a left-wing party. As economic variables, I include the 
local taxation base7 per citizen in DKK as a control for the relative wealth of the municipality and I 
also include a variable measuring the municipality’s average expenditure need per municipal 
                                                          
7 Average taxable income and wealth per municipal citizen. 
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citizen8 and a variable that measures the fiscal stress of the municipality.9 Geographical variables 
include the logs of population and population density.10 The demographic variables are the share of 
citizens with tertiary education, which can be seen as another potential proxy for the local citizens’ 
general information level, the local unemployment rate,11 and the share of municipal citizens aged 
65+. Finally, since amalgamation might have caused fluctuations in municipal debt and assets 
(Hansen et al., 2014), in later estimations I add a control for liquid assets per citizen measured in 
DKK as a control in some of the specifications. The different economic, geographical, and 
demographic variables are obtained from the Danish Ministry of the Interior. Descriptive statistics 
for all variables can be found in Table 1. 
 
 
  
                                                          
8 Measured in DKK and calculated by the Danish Ministry of the Interior. It is based on an assessment of the socio-
economic characteristics and the age structure of the municipality, including the share of children in low-education 
families and the general share of children and elderly. 
9 This is calculated as the expenditure need of the municipality, as defined by the Danish Ministry of the Interior, 
divided by the sum of the taxation per citizen base and municipal revenue from intergovernmental grants and the 
inter-municipal equalization scheme per citizen. 
10 Population density (unlogged) is the number of municipal citizens per square kilometer. 
11 Defined as the number of full-timed unemployed persons per 100 municipal citizens aged 17–64. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics  
  Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
Difference budgeted and realized surplus per citizen (DKK) 220.31 1250.53 -2655 13075 668 
Fiscal surplus per citizen (DKK) 1632.64 1613.27 -6565 17319 668 
Election 0.29 0.45 0 1 668 
Amalgamated 0.67 0.47 0 1 668 
Left-wing mayor 0.50 0.50 0 1 668 
Tax base (DKK) 157264.60 30012.01 115004 308944 668 
Fiscal stress 0.31 0.04 0.18 0.40 668 
Expenditure need (DKK) 52396.21 5535.35 38153.00 70817 668 
Log of population 10.64 0.78 7.52 13.23 668 
Log of population density 5.17 1.34 2.71 9.37 668 
Share of citizens with tertiary education 22.96 8.33 12.6 51 668 
Unemployment rate 3.82 1.39 1 8.7 668 
Share of citizens aged 65+ 17.93 3.250823 10 33.20 668 
Liquid assets (DKK) per citizen 1983.10 2654.36 -6272 13269 668 
Note: DKK is in current prices. 
 
The estimation is carried out using a municipal fixed-effect OLS regression12 with standard errors 
clustered at the municipal level and with time-fixed effects included in order to take a general trend 
in municipal budgetary overruns and deficits over the analyzed time period into account. The 
regression model is found in equation one with municipalities indexed by i and year by t. 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡𝐴𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡                (1) 
Where Yit is the measure of the level of the budget cycle, Electionit is a dummy taking the value 1 if 
municipal election is held in municipality i at time t and 0 otherwise. Amalgamated is a dummy 
taking the value 1 if the municipality was formed out of amalgamation in 2007 and is therefore a 
new municipality and 0 otherwise. X is a vector of controls, ηi and 𝛿𝑡 are the municipal-fixed and 
time-fixed effects, respectively, while ϵ is the error term. Since a municipality’s amalgamation 
                                                          
12 Hausman and F-tests generally suggest that this approach is suitable. The results from the Hausman tests are 
reported in the fixed-effects regression tables below.  
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status does not change over the analyzed period of time, it cannot be included separately in the 
fixed-effect estimation but its interaction13 with the election dummy enables the estimation of the 
effect of the amalgamation status on the scale of the local political budget cycle (Wooldridge, 2006: 
p. 488). 
 
5. Results 
5.1. Main results 
Table 2 show the main results from the empirical tests. In columns 1 and 2, the electoral cycle in 
budgetary overruns is reported, while the potential electoral budget cycle in municipal fiscal 
surplus/deficits is reported in columns 3 and 4. The political cycle in budgetary overruns is clearly 
visible from the models in columns 1 and 2. The occurrence of an election causes the realized fiscal 
surplus to fall over DKK 4,000 per citizen short of the original budgeted amount. Contrary to 
expectations, however, amalgamation does not increase the size of the election effect, limiting it 
instead, as the coefficient of the interaction between election and amalgamation is positive. The 
effects are highly statistically significant and do not change substantially after controlling for liquid 
assets per municipal citizen in column 2. 
 
As regards the potential electoral cycle in fiscal surplus/deficit, a relatively large and statistically 
significant election effect can be found. An election in a non-amalgamated municipality lowers the 
municipal surplus by on average around DKK 5,000 per citizen. As with budgetary overruns, 
however, the status of a new municipality seems to limit rather than increase the scope of the 
                                                          
13 Wald tests performed after each estimation generally suggest that the interactions are significant. 
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electoral cycle. The election–amalgamation interaction is not statistically significant and the budget 
cycle regarding municipal deficits is apparently unaffected by whether the municipality was formed 
from the 2007 amalgamation. Of the control variables, only municipal expenditure need and the 
share of municipal citizens aged 65+ seem to be statistically significantly associated with a larger 
realized versus budgeted surplus and larger fiscal surplus, which is surprising given how these are 
factors that should strain municipal expenditures. Given that transfers from the Danish central 
government and an intra-municipal equalization scheme are generally larger for higher levels of 
defined expenditure need, however, it might reflect revenue from this source. Increases in municipal 
population seem to increase the fiscal surplus, which is hardly surprising given that an increase in 
the population should lead to higher municipal tax revenue given the average taxation base. 
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Table 2. Main results  
  Realized vs. budgeted surplus Fiscal surplus 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Election  
-4394.42 
(1147.55)*** 
-4382.02 
(1150.89)*** 
-5460.62 
(1761.61)*** 
-5450.18 
(1771.93)*** 
Election × amalgamated  
323.80 
(139.57)** 
295.31 
(140.54)** 
210.67 
 (200.26) 
186.67 
 (192.31) 
Left-wing mayor  
180.96  
(136.98) 
179.57 
 (133.85) 
8.46 
 (179.34) 
7.30 
 (177.61) 
Tax base 
-0.02 
 (0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
0.02 
 (0.0318742) 
0.02 
 (0.03) 
Fiscal stress 
-9298.63 
(16386.78) 
-7897.32 
(16589.39) 
25291.47 
(20101.96) 
26471.98 
(20474.37) 
Expenditure need 
0.36 
 (0.07)*** 
0.36 
 (0.08)*** 
0.35 
 (0.13)*** 
0.35 
 (0.13)*** 
Log of population 
591.36 
 (4501.30) 
146.93 
 (4438.95) 
14062.81 
(6721.37)** 
13688.40 
(6696.70)** 
Log of population density 
5124.21 
(3892.93) 
4272.85 
(3501.02) 
731.97 
 (5966.57) 
14.76 
 (5576.42) 
Share of citizens with tertiary education 
34.83 
 (166.40) 
51.19 
 (158.05) 
79.51 
 (212.86) 
93.29 
 (212.12) 
Unemployment rate 
184.01 
 (104.65) 
164.25 
 (98.84)* 
153.48 
 (136.38) 
136.83 
 (134.20) 
Share of citizens aged 65+ 
373.83 
(126.862)*** 
388.14 
(133.15)*** 
426.53 
(137.56)*** 
438.58 
(142.68)*** 
Liquid assets (DKK) per citizen - 
-0.07 
 (0.06) 
- 
-0.06 
 (0.06) 
Municipal fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of municipalities 98 98 98 98 
Number of observations 686 686 686 686 
Hausman test value (p-value) 
50.51 
 (0.00) 
48.68  
(0.00) 
51.80  
(0.00) 
42.87 
 (0.00) 
Within R-square 0.42 0.43 0.42 0.43 
Both realized vs. budgeted surplus and fiscal surplus are measured in current DKK per citizen. Municipal clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
Judging from the results from Table 1, there seems to be no support in favor of Hypothesis 1; if 
anything, amalgamated municipalities experience smaller electoral budget cycles than non-
amalgamated municipalities. However this relationship is only statistically significant for budgetary 
overruns rather than pure fiscal surplus/deficit. 
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5.2. Effects over time 
Surprisingly, being a new municipality due to amalgamation does not appear to increase the scope 
of local political budget cycles but rather to decrease it, an effect especially strong and statistically 
robust for budgetary overruns. No support is thus found for Hypothesis 1. To explore these opposite 
than expected effects in relationship to hypothesis 2, a distinction is made in Table 3 between the 
2009 election, which was the first local election after the municipal reform, and the 2013 election, 
which was the next election. An electoral budget cycle is clearly present in both budgetary overruns 
and municipal deficit for both the 2009 and 2013 elections and there is still no statistically 
significant mediating effect of amalgamation status for fiscal surplus/deficit for either of the two 
elections. Amalgamation status does still seem to reduce the effect of election on budgetary 
overruns, although only for the 2009 election. So the effect of amalgamation status on the size of 
political budget cycles does not seem to be in line with the hypotheses. It does seem as though the 
mediating effect of amalgamation on the effect of elections on budgetary overruns does decrease 
from the first election after the amalgamation process, although the relative and modest coefficient 
size and level of statistical significance gives reason to interpret this with caution.14 
  
                                                          
14 Wald test performed after the two in Table 3 show that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients on 
the two election variables and the two interaction variables are similar. This is an additional reason to be cautious. 
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Table 3. Election and amalgamation effects over time  
  
Realized vs. 
budgeted surplus 
Fiscal surplus 
2009 election 
-3755.96 
(675.10)*** 
-4558.07 
(948.55)*** 
2009 election × amalgamated 
396.97 
 (203.01)* 
84.86 
 (264.46) 
2013 election  
-4203.03 
(1154.80)*** 
-5629.44 
(1714.18)*** 
2013 election × amalgamated 
180.76  
(222.05) 
301.39 
 (321.36) 
Left-wing mayor 
180.67 
 (134.41) 
6.20 
 (176.50) 
Tax base 
-0.02 
 (0.02) 
0.03 
 (0.03) 
Fiscal stress 
-7648.44 
 (16571.02) 
26222.73 
(20558.11) 
Expenditure need 
0.36 
 (0.08)*** 
0.35 
 (0.13)*** 
Log of population 
-515.95 
 (4837.97) 
14352.26 
(7210.75)** 
Log of population density 
4780.90  
(3641.20) 
-494.04 
(6077.72) 
Share of citizens with tertiary education 
39.79 
 (158.89) 
104.7047 
(218.6787) 
Unemployment rate 
152.08 
 (99.21) 
149.02 
 (140.34) 
Share of citizens aged 65+ 
390.42 
 (134.03)*** 
436.30 
(143.89)*** 
Liquid assets (DKK) per citizen 
-0.07 
 (0.06) 
-0.06 
 (0.06) 
Municipal fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Number of municipalities 98 98 
Number of observations 686 686 
Hausman test value (p-value) 
39.82  
(0.00) 
36.82 
 (0.00) 
Within R-square 0.43 0.43 
Both realized vs. budgeted surplus and fiscal surplus are measured in current DKK per citizen.  
Municipal clustered standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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There does not appear to be any evidence in favor of the “new political unit” hypothesis with 
regards to political budget cycles in Danish municipalities. If anything, newly amalgamated 
municipalities had lower electoral budget cycles than older municipalities; an effect that is only 
statistically robust for budgetary overruns rather than pure fiscal surplus/deficits. The next section 
further tests the robustness of these findings. 
 
5.3. Robustness test 
The main results in Tables 2 and 3 do not appear to provide evidence in favor of Hypotheses 1 and 
2 and the notion that political budget cycles should be smaller in new municipalities. On the 
contrary, electoral cycles in budgetary overruns seem to be smaller in amalgamated municipalities, 
at least in the first municipal election after the municipal reform. To test the robustness of the 
results, I conduct a number of robustness tests related to the measurement of the central independent 
variable and the estimation type used. 
 
The election dummy is first replaced with a continuous variable in Table 4, which measures the 
number of years until the next municipal election as a way of testing the effect of electoral concerns 
across the entire electoral cycle. The results again show a clear electoral cycle, as both budgetary 
overruns decrease and fiscal surplus increase when the number of years until the next election 
increase. Turning to the interaction with amalgamation status, while the coefficients indeed suggest 
that amalgamation status might reduce the budget cycle, the effect being far greater for budgetary 
overruns, the interactions are not statistically significant. Throughout the entire electoral cycle, 
amalgamation status does not seem to affect the prevalence of electoral cycle fiscal manipulation. 
These results are somewhat more reconcilable with the results from Table 3, however, which 
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suggests that the decreasing effect on amalgamation on the election effect of budgetary overruns 
was only statistically detectable in the first election after the amalgamation process and not across 
the whole analyzed period. 
 
Table 4. Alternative measure of electoral cycle 
  
Realized vs. 
budgeted surplus 
Fiscal surplus 
Years until next election 
2085.90 
(597.76)*** 
2615.08 
(912.20)*** 
Years until next election × amalgamated 
-66.02 
 (75.41) 
-15.61 
 (92.70) 
Left-wing mayor 
180.23 
 (133.18) 
7.60 
 (177.04) 
Tax base 
-0.02 
 (0.02) 
0.02 
 (0.03) 
Fiscal stress 
-6235.04 
 (16324.77) 
27786.39 
(20735.54) 
Expenditure need 
0.35 
 (0.08)*** 
0.34 
 (0.13)** 
Log of population 
-526.82 
 (4312.92) 
13095.04 
(6873.03)* 
Log of population density 
4384.67  
(3472.01) 
147.74 
 (5633.72) 
Share of citizens with tertiary education 
48.10  
(157.30) 
88.49 
 (214.17) 
Unemployment rate 
175.86 
 (97.54)* 
144.74 
 (136.20) 
Share of citizens aged 65+ 
387.41 
 (132.74)*** 
438.29 
(142.54)*** 
Liquid assets (DKK) per citizen 
-0.07 
 (0.06) 
-0.06  
(0.06) 
Municipal fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Number of municipalities 98 98 
Number of observations 686 686 
Hausman test value (p-value) 
49.72 
 (0.00) 
42.42 
 (0.00) 
Within R-square 0.43 0.42 
Both realized vs. budgeted surplus and fiscal surplus are measured in current DKK per citizen.  
Municipal clustered standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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I then set out to test the robustness of the core results using an alternative estimation strategy. The 
full estimation from Table 2 is therefore redone in Table 5, including a lagged dependent variable15 
and using a one-step system generalized method of moment estimation. With this estimation, the 
prevalence of a budget cycle in the public surplus/deficit remains clear and statistically significant. 
For budgetary overruns in column 1, however, the occurrence of a municipal election seems to 
increase the difference between realized and budgeted surplus and, thus, to reduce the size of 
budgetary overruns in contrast to the previous findings from the fixed-effect estimates. Neither of 
the two effects seem to be statistically significantly altered by the municipality’s amalgamation 
status. 
 
  
                                                          
15 Due to the relative short time span of the panel, the risk of Nickell bias when estimating a regression with both fixed 
effects and a lagged dependent variable would be substantial (Nickell 1981). 
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Table 5. Generalized methods of moments estimation 
  
Realized vs. 
budgeted surplus 
Fiscal surplus 
Lagged dependent variable 
0.23 
 (0.08)*** 
0.24  
(0.08)*** 
Election 
559.45 
 (234.23)** 
-1592.43 
(351.10)*** 
Election × amalgamated 
150.07 
(155.68) 
-65.05 
 (215.10) 
Left-wing mayor 
8.74 
(101.41) 
-18.04 
 (112.04) 
Tax base 
-0.00 
 (0.01) 
0.00 
 (0.01) 
Fiscal stress 
-7933.39 
 (7315.72) 
-1678.03 
 (9245.47) 
Expenditure need 
0.04 
 (0.04) 
0.01 
 (0.05) 
Log of population 
-54.02 
 (85.16) 
21.79 
(116.87) 
Log of population density 
-54.44 
 (64.70) 
144.06 
 (76.45)* 
Share of citizens with tertiary education 
5.22 
(10.44) 
-4.56 
 (13.30) 
Unemployment rate 
116.08 
(68.28)* 
121.43 
 (91.15) 
Share of citizens aged 65+ 
-21.25 
 (20.04) 
-42.59 
 (25.53)* 
Liquid assets (DKK) per citizen 
-0.020 
 (0.02) 
-0.02 
 (0.04) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Number of municipalities 98 98 
Number of observations 588 588 
Arellano-Bond test for AR2 value (p-value) 
-0.69  
(0.49) 
0.06 
 (0.95) 
Hansen statistics value (p-value) 
21.33  
(0.17) 
35.62  
(0.00) 
Both realized vs. budgeted surplus and fiscal surplus are measured in current DKK per citizen.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
The results from the robustness test again provide evidence against the two hypotheses and the 
argument that political budget cycles should be larger in new political units. They also suggest that 
the finding from Tables 2 and 3, which suggest that election-year budgetary overruns might be 
smaller in amalgamated municipalities, might be more uncertain than the core results suggest. 
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6. Discussion 
The statistical tests failed to confirm either of the two hypotheses on the effect of being a new 
political unit on the size of political budget cycles. Quite conversely, the findings suggest that—if 
anything—new municipalities had smaller political budget cycles but only with regards to 
budgetary overruns, an effect that was not particularly robust to alternative specifications. 
 
If there was indeed any effect of amalgamation status on budget cycles among the analyzed 
municipalities, it was a decrease in the size of the budget cycles in budgetary overruns. The 
question then becomes why there was this potentially decreasing effect of budget cycles in 
budgetary overruns. One possibility is better and more efficient management, especially regarding 
municipal finances. Previous research examining the effect of municipal reform in Denmark finds 
that amalgamated municipalities seem to have improved their administrative efficiency (Blom-
Hansen et al., 2014; Hansen et al., 2014: p. 210) and therefore perhaps also their capacity within 
budgetary management, which might lead to smaller budgetary overruns. Another possibility, which 
is in line with the reputation-building argument from Section 2 above, is that local politicians in 
amalgamated municipalities might have increased their efforts to prevent large budgetary overruns 
by making better and more realistic election-year budget forecasts to build a reputation for better 
fiscal management among voters in their new municipalities; while this reputation-building 
incentive had no effect on the existence or scale of election-year fiscal expansion. This might 
explain why the limiting effect of amalgamation on budgetary overruns is only statistically 
significant in the first election after the amalgamation of 2007, where the incentive to build 
reputation would plausibly be largest. 
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Overall, however, the results do not provide any support in favor of the argument that political 
budget cycles are larger in new subnational political units, everything else being equal. The 
proposed mechanisms contributing to larger political budget cycles in new political units—that the 
incumbent local politicians had increased incentive to acquire reputation and that voters lacked 
information about the previous actions of local politicians in new political units and regimes—do 
not seem to hold for the new Danish municipalities created from the Danish municipal reform. 
These results suggest that incumbent reputation-building and the lack of context-specific 
information of previous budget cycles available to the voters in new political units might not be 
relevant mediating mechanisms for the size of political budget cycles. The interesting question then 
becomes why this is the case. 
 
With regards to local incumbent reputation-building incentives, a potential explanation for the 
results of this article could be that the age of the relevant political parties—rather than the age of the 
political unit itself—conditions the incentive to acquire a reputation and thus the size of the political 
budget cycle, as the research by Hanusch and Keefer (2014) would suggest. This could reconcile 
the findings from the new Danish municipalities. While the municipal reform might have shifted the 
balance of power from one Danish party to another in some municipalities, it did very little to 
change the overall party system. Both before and after the reform, two major parties held the vast 
majority of the mayor’s seats in Danish municipalities. These two parties, the Liberal Party and the 
Social Democrats, were established party brands with a history going back to 1870 and 1871, 
respectively. The institutionalization of the Danish local party system might explain why new 
municipalities did not experience higher levels of political budget cycles in the years after the 
reform, as incumbents were able to draw on the reputational brand of their political parties. 
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As regards the voter information mechanism, an explanation of the results could be that it is the 
overall experience with democratic politics rather than polity-specific information, which is the 
relevant mechanism for whether political budget cycles are thought to be effective. Consequently, 
experience with democratic politics rather than polity-specific political information might be the 
key conditioning factor for the size of political budget cycles.16 While citizens in new municipalities 
might have had little or no information about the previous functions of their new local polity, since 
the organization was new, their overall experience with democracy and local democratic politics 
would have been unchanged.17 
 
7. Conclusion 
Does the age of a political unit determine the magnitude of election-year fiscal manipulation? This 
article has investigated this specific explanation for political budget cycles by investigating a recent 
municipal reform in Denmark, which created new political units in a quasi-experimental manner. 
Contrary to expectations, however, there is no sign of a larger political budget cycle in the new 
municipalities compared to older municipalities. While municipal politicians might have had a 
relatively lower level of local reputation in new municipalities and voters in new municipalities 
might have had lower levels of context-specific political knowledge about their municipality than 
voters in non-amalgamated municipalities, these factors do not seem to have induced local 
                                                          
16 Authors within this literature even seem to use the democratic experience and information mechanism somewhat 
interchangeably (Brender and Drazen, 2005: pp. 1289-1290). As the results in this article suggest, however, these two 
potential mechanisms could be very different and might not be perfectly correlated in different settings. 
17 Research by Lassen and Serritzlew (2011) suggest that the amalgamation process might have lowered internal 
political efficacy among local citizens; however, this change does not seem to have had any significant impact on local 
political budget cycles. 
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politicians to run larger political budget cycles. On the contrary, with regards to budgetary overruns, 
new municipalities might have had significantly smaller election-year budgetary overruns, at least 
in the first election after the reform. 
 
The findings of this article speak to general literature on conditional political budget cycles and the 
mechanisms driving the conditionality of political budget cycles. Incumbent incentive and voter 
information are often thought to be crucial factors in this area (Shi and Svensson, 2006), but the 
results here suggest that the precise operationalization and mechanism behind these conditional 
factors might matter greatly for whether they actually affect the existence and size of political 
budget cycles. The results suggest that context-specific political experience and the knowledge of 
citizens might matter less than their overall experience with democratic politics (Brender and 
Drazen, 2005) and/or the age and structure of the relevant party system (Hanusch and Keefer, 2014) 
for the incentive for incumbents to engage in election-year fiscal manipulation. Investigating these 
issues in other subnational contexts might be a fruitful venue for future research. 
 
Future research on both cross-national and local political budget cycles could pay more attention to 
the proposed mechanisms driving the apparent conditionality of political budget cycles (de Haan 
and Klomp, 2013) and develop research designs to investigate these mechanisms causally. This 
article is a modest step in this direction. 
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